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ARTICLES 
Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The 
"Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance 
in Litigation" Rules 
JAMES E. MOLITERNO* 
Black letter lawyer ethics law prohibits lawyers from acquiring an interest in 
the subject of litigation 1 and from providing most forms of financial assistance to 
litigation clients? The received wisdom of the last two generations of lawyers 
says that these rules are well-rooted, uncontroversial, and beyond serious debate. 
In reality, the rationale for the rules is weak and the received wisdom is flawed 
and false. The recent Ethics 2000 Commission inspired amendments to the Model 
* James E. Moliterno is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School. A Law 
School Research Grant supported the production of this article. Many thanks to Chad Carder and Jeff Baker for 
their excellent research assistance. 
I. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule 1.8(i) (the acquisition of interest rule was designated !.8(j) 
from 1983 to 2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-!03(A) 
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36(1) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. Model Rule 1.8(i) reads as follows: 
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation 
the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
(I) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees and expenses; and 
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. 
In substance, DR 5-103(A) reads identically. 
2. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e); MODEL CODE DR 5-103(8); RESTATEMENT§ 36(2). Model Rule 1.8(e) reads as 
follows: 
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated 
litigation, except that: 
( l) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be 
contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf 
of the client. 
DR 5-103(8) reads as follows. 
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not 
advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client except that ... [a] lawyer may advance or 
guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of 
medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains 
ultimately liable for such expenses. 
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Rules make no substantive change in the acquisition rules, 3 and the Restatement 
of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) does not suggest a change.4 These 
rules are not only supported by conflict of interest rationales, but are also based in 
part on the champerty, barratry and maintenance laws that have in most places 
been abandoned, and on anti-competitive, client-getting concerns. 
The rules themselves are anomalous. The normal waiver of conflicts notions 
fail to fit: clients would be presumably delighted to waive the "conflict" presented 
by the financial support of their lawyer. After all, to the extent these are conflict 
rules at all, the interests in conflict are not exclusively, nor perhaps even 
dominantly, between the lawyer and the client, but rather are between the 
lawyer's and client's joint interests and those of the system and of third parties 
who are the objects of the litigation being supported by the lawyer. But to the 
extent that they represent a conflict between the client's and lawyer's joint 
interests and those of third parties or the justice system, they are not conflicts 
rules at all, but rather are flawed maintenance, champerty and barratry rules that 
have little to distinguish their reach from routine parallel interests of lawyers and 
their clients. To the extent that they are really champerty and maintenance rules, 
they should be thought of in conjunction with other client-getting devices. In any 
event, the American Law Institute (ALI) Restatement uses a conflicts of interest 
standard that would not include these rules to the extent that they are based on 
champerty or maintenance: the ALI standard regards as a conflict only those 
impairments of professional judgment that adversely affect a client.5 To find a 
rationale for a rule that would restrict a lawyer's representation activities on the 
ground that third parties or the system might suffer, the Restatement reader must 
go elsewhere.6 They are really only conflict rules in the usual sense to the extent 
that the "invested" lawyer might subvert the case for his or her purposes rather 
than for the client's.7 
The careful study of these rules could have a significant impact on the practice, 
especially class action, mass tort, consumer litigation, and personal injury 
practice. The analysis of these rules could also affect the analysis of the ancillary 
business rules and multidisciplinary practice issues because of the relationships 
between financial services businesses and lawyers should these rules be 
abolished. What should be the bar's reaction when the interests of lawyer and 
3. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e), (i). 
4. RESTATEMENT § 36(1 ), (2). Nonetheless, the Restatement Reporters preferred a relaxed set of acquisition 
of interest rules: "The Reporters support the minority position, but that position was not accepted by the 
Institute." RESTATEMENT§ 36, Reporter's Note. 
5. RESTATEMENT§ 121. 
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT§§ 34, 35, 36. 
7. See infra section II I.A. The Restatement drafters stated one of the rule's rationales as follows: "[Financial 
assistance is regulated] because a loan gives the lawyer the conflicting role of a creditor and could induce the 
lawyer to conduct litigation so as to protect the lawyer's interests rather than the client's." RESTATEMENT § 36 
cmt. c; Shea v. Va. State Bar, 374 S.E.2d 63 (Va. 1988). 
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client are aligned in a way greater than that of client and lawyer? What happens 
when the lawyer has financial interests in the client's affairs that are greater than 
the interest in the lawyer's fee? Would a market for claims in which lawyers may 
participate as buyers be a good or bad thing? 
The modern rules are largely based on three doctrines with long history: 
champerty, maintenance, and barratry. Although historically more complicated, 
champerty is often defined as the acquisition of a share of another's claim.8 
Maintenance is the supporting (maintaining) of a litigant that enables the litigant 
to carry on a claim.9 Barratry is incitement or encouragement of another to bring 
or continue a claim. 10 To be tortious or criminal, all three, significantly, required 
an element of malice. 11 Thus, at common law, only malicious acquisition of 
claims, maintenance of litigants or litigation encouragement were unlawful. 
It is commonly thought that the champerty restrictions are of very long-
standing, and that they are deeply rooted in law and culture. And in some respects 
they are indeed well-rooted, having antecedents as far back as Roman and Greek 
law. 12 Surprisingly, though, these restrictions were never very broad or powerful 
until the first half of the 20th Century, and never more broad and powerful than 
they were in the last half of the 20th Century. Many late 19th and early 20th 
Century courts found their rationales wanting, and refused to enforce the 
restrictions. 13 Not until the adoption of the 1969 Model Code did the restrictions 
leap in breadth and severity. At that time, they began being treated with an 
unwarranted reverence, as if the 1970's version of the restrictions had been firmly 
rooted since the Roman law and 12th Century English common law beginning 
notions of champerty. This reverence has produced many formalist, one-
dimensional judicial applications of the rules 14 that lacked interest or willingness 
to question the quality of the rationales underlying the rules. Had these courts 
examined the rationales closely, they would have found them wanting in many 
respects. 
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (4th ed. 1968); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 489-90; 
Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty, 71 
CHI. KENT. L. REV. 625, 639 ( 1995); E. H. BODKIN, MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY 39-40 ( 1935). 
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1106; WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 490; BODKIN, supra note 8, at 
11-12. 
I 0. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 190; WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 490; BODKIN, supra note 8, at 
49. 
II. WOLFRAM, supra note 8 at 490, n.46; See generally, Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. 
REV. 48 (1934); BODKIN, supra note 8, at 5, 50. 
12. Radin, supra note II, at 48-54. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 72-98. Stanton v. Embry, 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1876) (stating that the 
lawfulness of contingent fees is "beyond legitimate controversy."); Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747 (Ohio 1892); 
Johnson v. Great N. Ry. Co., !51 N.W. 125 (Minn. 1915). 
14. See infra cases and discussion cited at note 147; WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 9 (1998) 
(using the term "categorical" to describe judicial decision-making in the absence of discretion). 
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In this paper, I will examine the history of these rules, critique their rationales, 
and propose the abolition or substantial amendment of these rules. 
I. How AND FROM WHERE DID THESE RULES EVOLVE? 
Early on in Western legal history, it was believed that trials should be limited to 
the judge and the two parties. Anyone else who intruded "between the judge and 
the parties could only mean mischief." 15 
There was an exception to this rule: parties were commonly supported by their 
friends, kinsmen or followers, their secta, or a person's "back." 16 The secta 
would often help prepare legal arguments, or even speak on the litigant's 
behalf. 17 Our modem notions of a system of advocacy grew largely from this 
custom. Despite the acceptance, even expectation, that a party be supported by 
his secta, the basic notion that no one but the litigants should be involved in a trial 
was one that persisted throughout the history of European law, influencing later 
legal developments. 
A person who appeared in court without a secta was at a considerable 
disadvantage, and because of the difference in sheer numbers and power between 
the secta of the powerful and of the poor, the poor could not often hope to prevail 
against a more powerful litigant. 18 In the 6th century BC, public interest 
motivated Greek reforms made it possible for "kindly men to come to the 
assistance of such wretches as poor and friendless plaintiffs." 19 For the first time, 
intervention on behalf of another by someone other than a friend or kinsman was 
permitted. 20 
This special power came to be abused in Athens as the instances permitting this 
intervention increased.21 The intervention, especially its abuse, came to be called 
"sycophancy", and its practitioners "sychophants. "22 Because disinterestedness 
in a case one prosecuted came to be regarded as suspicious, sychophants often 
invented some imaginary private interest in the matter so as to appear to be a 
legitimate member of a litigant's secta rather than a sychophant.23 Sycophancy 
was also used as a method of political agitation, in which people formed political 
"clubs"24 whose members supported each other in litigation which was deliber-
15. Radin, supra note II, at 48. 
16. !d. 
17. !d. at 50. See generally ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS 200-44 (1922). 
18. Radin, supra note II, at 49. 
19. !d. 
20. !d. 
21. JOHN OSCAR LOFBERG, SYCOPHANCY IN ATHENS 3-4,7 (Arno Press 1979) (1917). 
22. Radin, supra note II, at 49-51. See also LOFBERG, supra note 21, at 46-47; BONNER, supra note 17, at 
59-71. 
23. Radin, supra note II, at 50. 
24. LOFBERG, supra note 21, at 59; BoNNER, supra note 17, at 203-04. 
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ately fomented against political foes. 25 Athens not only allowed this form of 
intervention, but also allowed the acquisition of interest in the subject matter of 
litigation. 26 
In Rome advocacy became a recognized profession27 and yet the fiction of a 
sychophant's personal interest or connection with the litigant remained.28 Fees 
could not be charged for this service.Z9 The derision of "sycophancy" (known to 
the Romans as calumnia),30 while it continued, was less pronounced than in 
Athens. 31 In public cases, calumnia only applied to charges that were false. In the 
absence of state-supported prosecution machinery, the state relied on private 
citizens to prosecute wrongs. 32 A successful prosecution meant that the case had 
merit, and therefore no charge of calumnia could be leveled at its prosecutor. 
Rome, unlike Greece, did not allow the trafficking in claims by third parties, 
but in the second and third centuries, it became common that a claim might be 
sold or given to a powerful person, whose prosecution of the claim was more 
likely to succeed.33 
Christianity's influence on the Roman Empire changed the view of calumnia to 
an extent. The Christian attitude was that litigation, even of legitimate, sound 
claims, was itself something to be discouraged. 34 Bringing litigation, even 
successful litigation, was viewed suspiciously, and hired advocates, men who 
professed special skill in legal matters, were regarded as dangerous because of 
their ability to skillfully manipulate legal procedures.35 
Medieval Europe's trials by ordeal or battle produced a justifiable fear and 
trepidation about being a litigant. 36 With the exception of the despised practice of 
a litigant who was incompetent to stand battle selecting a representative, or a 
champion,37 intervention of any kind was not looked upon kindly. 
As the legal system became more complicated in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, expertise in the legal process became more valuable, more feared, and 
more suspect. This need for legal expertise was filled by attorneys and the 
narratores and their apprentices, the later barristers.38 
25. Radin, supra note II, at 51. See also GEORGE MILLER CALHOUN, ATHENIAN CLUBS IN POLITICS AND 
LITIGATION 40-80 (1913). 
26. Radin, supra note II, at 51; LOFBERG, supra note 21, at 47. 
27. Radin, supra note II, at 52. 
28. /d. 
29. !d. at 53; BoNNER, supra note 17, at 206-08. 
30. Radin, supra note II, at 52. 
31. ld. 
32. !d. at 56. 
33. /d. at 54. 
34. !d. at 56. 
35. Radin, supra note II, at 56. 
36. ld at 58. 
37. !d. at 58-59. 
38. /d. at 59. 
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That these persons were looked upon with suspicion was, of course, not only to 
the ancient dread and distrust of all legal experts, but also the ancient feeling 
against representation generally, and to a constantly growing feeling that the 
machinery of justice, just because it was complicated, was easily perverted. But 
their presence was likewise resented because they encouraged resort to the law 
and such resort among Christians ought to be discouraged. 39 
As in Roman law, unsuccessful plaintiffs were presumptively guilty of 
calumnia, but because the attorney's early common law royal writ justified his 
appearance, he was protected from being thought of as a calumniator merely by 
being an attorney.40 Similarly, the narratores were exempted. Attorneys and 
narratores were simply the instruments through which calumniators operated.41 
Buying interests in litigation, like litigation itself, was also strongly discour-
aged in medieval Europe, and it is from this practice that the term "champerty" 
arose.
42 
The English knew another form of calumnia, called maintenance, or "the 
support given by a feudal magnate to his retainers in all their suits, without any 
reference to justification."43 Both the Star Chamber Act of 1487 and the Statute of 
Liveries of 1504 were specifically directed against this practice.44 Maintenance 
was an implement of private wars over the accumulation of land and power. The 
support for litigants in this context was support by the powerful of those owing 
allegiance to the supporter. By this means, the feudal supporter could acquire 
interests in land through the litigation of his minions and supporters. The 
movement against maintenance was, therefore, part of the conflict between the 
Crown and feudal lords, and indeed, feudalism itself.45 The offense of barratry in 
England meant the habitual provision of maintenance.46 However, with all three 
of these offenses, champerty, maintenance and barratry, lawyers were not the 
barrators, maintainors, or champertors.47 Lawyers were again simply the 
instruments by which those offenses were perpetrated. Further, none of the of-
fenses existed without the element of malice by the offender against the practice's 
victim.48 
Despite these no longer relevant historical origins, they have remained 
offenses and become more focused on lawyer conduct. Eventually, the offenses 
39. /d. 
40. Radin, supra note II, at 60. 
41. /d. at 65. 
42. The term originally came from the name of a little used estate in land that had attributes analogous to 
those of acquiring a share of a claim. !d. at 61. 
43. /d. at 64. 
44. /d. at 64; BODKIN, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
45. Radin, supra note II, at 64. 
46. /d. at 64-65. 
47. /d. at 65. 
48. In re Gilman's Administratrix, 167 N.E. 437,439 (N.Y. 1929) (citing I Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 
27(6), § 26, p. 460); WOLFRAM, supra note 8 at 490, n.46; BoDKIN, supra note 8, at 5, 50. 
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found a new rationale in the "fundamental distrust of legal procedure and of 
lawyers ... [and they] became almost specialized as a lawyer's transgression."49 
United States courts correctly declared that maintenance and champerty were 
prohibited in England because of its special circumstances and history and had no 
real rationale or policy support in the different circumstances pertaining in the 
United States.50 
But the lawyers have moved from the position of being the occasional and more 
or less casual instruments of maintainers into the front line of this form of 
offending. This is probably the inevitable result of the change by which lawyers 
instead of being a small number of highly privileged technicians, not really in 
competition with each other because all were assured of a living, became an 
enormously large group constituting a recognized calling and competing 
desperately for an amount of legal business which could not possibly provide 
for all of them. The old and ingrained popular resentment against lawyers 
gained a new rationalization. It seemed likely that active competitors for legal 
business would seek every possible means not only of preempting what was 
open to all, but of multiplying it. 51 
The new rationale was more an anti-client-getting and internal-to-the-legal-
profession anti-competitive rationale. Meanwhile, other means of controlling 
abuse of the legal system with unfounded claims developed,52 obviating the 
abuse-of-system-prevention need for the law of maintenance, champerty and 
barratry. 53 
A particular form of "maintenance by champerty," the contingent fee, arose in 
the United States. It seemed unfair in the context of the spirit and culture of the 
United States that an impecunious claimant might have to forgo an otherwise 
good claim.54 Moral questionability of the sort of speculation involved in the 
contingent fee never held the same weight in the United States as it had 
previously in Europe. Contingent fees became fairly common. The growth in 
contingent fees coincided with a time of rapid change in both transportation and 
manufacturing production, and the associated slower development of actions for 
49. Radin, supra note II, at 66. BODKIN, supra note 8, at 60-91. 
50. Radin, supra note II, at 68-70, and n.82. See, e.g., Reece, 31 N .E. at 7 49. 
51. Radin, supra note II, at 68. 
52. On the tort of malicious prosecution, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 674; W. L. 
PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 890-91 (1984); Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious 
Prosecution Debate: A Historical Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1978). On frivolous claims law, see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. II; James V. Ward IV, Rule II and Factually Frivolous Claims-The Goal of Cost Minimization and the 
Client's Duty to Investigate, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (1991); Byron C. Keating, Toward a Balanced Approach to 
Frivolous Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 
1067 (1994). On sanctions against lawyers who abuse process, see David W. Pollak, Note, Sanctions Imposed 
by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Civil Process, 44 U. CHIC. L. REv. 619 (1977). 
53. STORY ON CONTRACTS§ 711 (1954); Reece, 31 N.E. at 749. 
54. Radin, supra note II, at 70. 
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negligence. 55 The organized bar condemned the practice. But the condemnation 
was suspect because the bar's official utterances emanated from its more 
successful members who represented litigants of means who not only had little 
occasion to enter into contingent fee contracts but were the frequent defendants in 
actions brought by injured plaintiffs in need of the contingent fee arrangements. 56 
Their condemnation was ultimately unsuccessful, however, as the codes of legal 
ethics were compelled by the implications of common law courts to recognize 
and officially tolerate an already established type of fee arrangement. 57 
In most respects, the organized bar of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries 
followed58 the ethics guidance of two 19th Century American writers: David 
Hoffman59 and George Sharswood.60 Hoffman distinguished between providing 
financial assistance, which he pledged to provide, and acquiring an interest in a 
client's claim, of which he disapproved: "[T]he object of my resolution ... is 
against purchasing, in whole or in part, my client's rights, after the relation of 
client and counsel, in respect to it, has been ... established."61 "Should [my 
client's] wants be pressing, it will be an act of humanity to relieve them myself, if 
I am able ... But in no case will I permit ... my benevolence ... to seduce me 
into any participation of his pending claim .... "62 
Sharswood, by contrast, though he recognizes the unmistakably lawful status 
of contingent fees, is staunchly anti-contingent fee and groups acquisition of 
interest and financial assistance with contingent fees, sounding disapproval of 
them all, yet recognizing that the English champerty laws are largely not in effect 
in the United States. He recognizes that his objections are not legal objections but 
rather moral ones. 63 Sharswood encourages lawyers to refrain from engaging in 
legal contingent fee arrangements and rather to set a fee or accept the favor of the 
impecunious client after the conclusion of the matter, taking into account the 
success of the matter and the client's new-found ability to pay.64 
Such advice harkens back to traditions of the early English bar of accepting 
55. !d. at 71. Stanton, 93 U.S. 548. 
56. Radin, supra note 11, at 71./n re Sizer, 267 S.W. 922 (Mo. 1924); Johnson, !51 N.W. 125; JEROLD S. 
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 41-50, 130 ( 1976). 
57. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 12, 13 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS]. 
58. The 1908 ABA Canons, the first national effort to articulate lawyer ethics standards, were nearly 
verbatim from the Alabama Code of Ethics, which was in turn drawn largely from Sharswood and somewhat 
from Hoffman's writings. See generally James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 781, 789-90 (1997); Am. Bar Ass'n Corum. on Code of Prof' I Ethics, Final Report, 33 
ABA REP. 567, 569 (1908) ("The foundation of the draft for canon of ethics, herewith submitted, is the code 
adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887 ... "). 
59. DAVID HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions on Professional Deportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2nd ed. 
1836). 
60. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1860). 
61. HOFFMAN, supra note 59, Res. XXIV at 761-62. 
62. !d. 
63. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 60, at 153-65. 
64. See id. 
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only gratmttes for services rendered.65 Such traditions had nearly faded by 
Sharswood's time in England, had never much pertained in the United States, and 
were no more than memories by the time the Alabama Bar and later the American 
Bar Association (ABA) largely copied Sharswood's ideas in the first adopted 
professional bar codes. The Alabama Code, first among the state codes and the 
one upon which, except for advertising and solicitation provisions, the 1908 ABA 
Canons of Ethics (1908 Canons) would be based, says little about either 
acquisition of interest or financial assistance. The closest provision is focused 
more on conflict of interest and the fear that lawyers might take advantage of 
clients in negotiating over the purchase of claims: "Attorneys ought scrupulously 
to refrain from bargaining about the subject matter of the litigation, so long as the 
relation of attorney and client continue."66 At the time, this advantage-taking 
concern was central to the rationale for champerty restrictions.67 
The 1908 Canons originally said simply, "[t]he lawyer should not purchase 
any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting. "68 But 
the Canons were not explicit regarding loans.69 As such, they went further than 
either Hoffman or the Alabama Code in disapproving of acquisition of interests 
and financial assistance, picking up more on Sharswood's moral-rather-than-legal-
based disapproval. Even then, the Canons' disapproval and prohibition did not go 
nearly as far as the bar's 1960's70 and 1980's71 pronouncements. 
To be sure, at the tum of the 201h Century there was much agitation by the 
dominant elements of the organized bar against provision of financial assistance 
to clients in litigation. The courts of the time were not persuaded by their 
arguments, at least when the financial assistance was not provided in order to 
solicit the client's business. Courts did not regard such financial assistance as 
being against public policy and failed to see the apocalyptic consequences 
outlined by the prosecutors.72 Reece v. Kyle is a classic example?3 In Reece, 
lawyer and client entered a contract, alleged to be champertous, by which the 
65. See Reece, 31 N.E. at 750. 
66. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS 38 (1887). 
67. F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 38 (1964); HOFFMAN, supra note 59, Res. XXIV 
at 760; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns Ch 44 (N.Y. Ch. 1821) (primary reason for prohibiting lawyers from buying 
clients' claims is to keep savvy lawyers from taking advantage of clients regarding the value of the claim). 
68. 1908 CANONS Canon I 0. 
69. 1908 CANONS Canon 42 comes closest to such a restriction. 
70. See MODEL CODE DR 5-103(A), (B) (1969). 
71. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e), G) (1969). 
72. Some leaders of the bar went to extraordinary lengths to pursue ethics charges against offenders. See, 
e.g., Sizer, 267 S.W. 922 (conglomeration of railroads, utilities and their lawyers hired investigator to pursue 
charges against plaintiffs' lawyers for providing financial assistance to clients); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. 
McCallum, 173 N.E. 827 (Ill. 1930) (railroad lawyers hired agent to pose as worker, fake an accident and 
serious injuries, retain target personal injury lawyers, and defraud court in effort to entrap target personal injury 
lawyers into engaging in financial assistance violations); Johnson, 151 N.W. 125 (railroad defended action for 
fee by plaintiff's lawyer on grounds that lawyer was engaged in champerty and maintenance). 
73. 31N.E.at747. 
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lawyer agreed to "purchase" a one-half interest in client's claim in exchange for 
the lawyer's services to collect a judgment. At the time of the challenged contract, 
the lawyer's fee for obtaining the judgment was unsatisfied. Lawyer and client 
agreed that lawyer would pursue the judgment in exchange for a one half interest 
in the judgment itself. Resembling a contingent fee, but cast as an assignment of 
the one-half interest in the claim, lawyer and client became "joint owners of the 
claim."74 The court determined that there was no fraud, no over reaching, no bad 
faith. 75 The court defined maintenance and champerty to require "officious 
intermeddling,"76 and outlined the history of the doctrines ("common then for 
nobles or other powerful men to take transfers of pretended rights in action ... 
and prosecute them, to the great oppression of the weak"77) in a way no later 
court, armed with the language of Model Rule 1.8(e) or DR 5-103(B) needs to do. 
The court noted that historically, weak legal processes (juries were typically 
composed of the nobles' dependants) allowed these false claims to be pursued 
with success. "But as methods of judicial procedure improved, and a firmer and 
purer administration of justice was attained, ... the mischiefs complained of 
became less apparent and the enforcement of such statutes [prohibiting mainte-
nance and champerty] became of less and less importance. "78 
It would not be wise to carry rules adopted originally for the purpose of 
preventing the powerful from oppressing the weak, by groundless suits in the 
courts, to the extent of hindering the weak in efforts to avail themselves of 
lawful remedies against the powerful, now that the conditions making the 
ancient rules necessary have substantially disappeared, and new conditions, 
arisen, by reason of which it has become the interest of the powerful to 
embarrass and hinder the dependant and weak from obtaining speedy justice in 
the courts.79 ... That contracts similar to the one at bar were regarded 
dangerous three or four hundred years ago is not a powerful reason for so 
d. h 80 regar mg t em now .... 
The Reece court cited a 1791 case81 criticizing the administration of the 
maintenance doctrine in England: "That such doctrine, repugnant to every honest 
feeling of the human heart, should soon be laid aside, must be expected .... We 
may venture to say that the maxim was a bad one, and that it proceeded on a 
foundation which fails." 82 
Even then, the Reece court said, with the adoption subsequent to the 
74. /d. at 748. 
75. ld. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 749. 
78. Reece, 31 N.E. at 749. 
79. /d. at 75 I. 
80. /d. at 750. 
81. Master v. Miller, 4 Term R. 340, 341 ( 1791 ). 
82. Reece, 31 N .E. at 751. 
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maintenance statutes of various litigation controls such as "the statute of frauds, 
the extension of the action for malicious prosecution, and that for awarding costs 
against unsuccessful parties, [all of which] have contributed materially to the 
discouragement of groundless and vexatious litigation" the need for the law of 
maintenance or champerty had been diminished to the point at which Story said 
that the doctrine is " 'to be now confined to cases where a stranger, having no 
interest in the suit, for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife (emphasis 
added) encourages others to bring actions and make defenses they have no right 
to make (emphasis added).' "83 Ohio then had a statute making it criminal to stir 
up controversy for the purpose of injuring the defendant. The statute also created 
liability for the injured party. 84 
The Reece court also considered that early English lawyers were incapacitated 
from making a contract for fees at the time of the doctrine's rise. Clients could 
offer the lawyer a gratuity. That obviously made for greater suspicion of a lawyer 
taking an interest in a claim or being paid by contingent fee. 85 No such notion 
ever pertained in the United States. 
Finally, the court discussed the poor fit between the common law doctrines and 
property rights, noting that the client could plainly have assigned his rights in the 
judgment to the lawyer (or anyone) in exchange for other consideration.86 
At the time of the Reece decision, courts were careful to restrain contracts that 
evinced a "gambling spirit,"87 a factor which has modestly continued to animate 
a few states' champerty restrictions.88 
In another example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that although good 
taste may be desirable, in the absence of a statute, it could not rule solicitation 
against public policy.89 As well, the court could not find "any sound reason" to 
consider as against public policy "the practice of advancing money to the injured 
client with which to pay living expenses or hospital bills during the pendency of 
the case and while he is unable to earn anything. [Such a practice] may, in a sense, 
tend to foment litigation by preventing a settlement from necessity .... It is not 
against public policy for an attorney to loan his client money to enable him to 
carry on the suit."90 
In Johnson v. Great Northern Railway Company, a lawyer represented a 
personal injury client.91 Defendant railroad approached the client without notice 
83. /d. at 749, citing STORY ON CONTRACfS § 711. 
84. /d. at 751. 
85. Id. at 750. 
86. /d. 
87. Reece, 31 N.E. at 751. 
88. See, e.g., Wilson v. Harris, 688 So. 2d 265,268-69 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 
583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
89. Johnson, 151 N.W. at 127. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. at 126. 
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to the plaintiff's lawyer and negotiated a settlement.92 Plaintiff's lawyer then 
sought enforcement of his fee contract against defendant railroad. 
The railroad defended on the ground that plaintiff's lawyer was engaged in the 
"business and conspiracy of unlawfully stirring up strife and contention and 
vexatious and speculative litigation between defendant and persons having 
personal injury claims against this defendant .... "93 The court disagreed with the 
railroad's position, finding no policy reason to support a ban on financial 
assistance. 
In People v. McCallum, the Illinois Supreme Court stated its approval of 
financial assistance in clear, resounding rationales nearing praise, similar to those 
supporting contingency fees. 94 In McCallum, the railroad defendant hired an 
agent to pose as worker, fake an accident and serious injuries, retain McCallum, 
and defraud the court in an effort to entrap McCallum into engaging in 
solicitation and financial assistance violations.95 After reviewing the underlying 
facts and concluding that the charges were largely unsustainable against 
McCallum, the court rendered its view of financial assistance: 
The evidence shows that at various times the McCallums have advanced living 
expenses to needy clients who had claims for personal injuries against railroad 
companies where respondent had a fee contract, which was a lien upon any 
damages which might be recovered upon the injury. In most such cases the 
clients were unable to work, had no money or property, and their only asset was 
the claim for damages against the railroad, upon which respondent had a lien. 
We know of no law which makes it more unethical, under such circumstances, 
to advance living and medical expenses to the client, and so prevent his 
becoming a public charge, than it would be, if the client's only asset were a 
piece of real estate, to advance him, on a mortgage thereon, money for such 
expense. It is not uncommon for attorneys to commence actions for poor people 
and make advances of money necessary to the prosecution of the suit upon the 
credit of the cause. Thus a man in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain 
justice in a case where without such aid he would be unable to enforce a just 
claim .... The practice of advancing money to the injured client with which to 
pay living expenses or hospital bills during the pendency of the case and while 
he is unable to earn anything may in a sense tend to foment litigation by 
preventing an unjust settlement from necessity, but we are aware of no 
authority holding that is against public policy or of any sound reason why it 
should be so considered.96 
The same financial assistance accepted in Reece, Johnson and McCallum today 
92. Interestingly, no mention is made of the railroad lawyer's inappropriate contact with the plaintiff. 
93. Johnson,l5l N.W.at 126. 
94. McCallum, 173 N .E at 831. 
95. /d. at 828. 
96. /d. at 831. 
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would violate Model Rule 1.8(e), most likely rece1vmg a highly formalistic 
application, perhaps with comment about the long historical foundation for the 
rule.97 
While courts were accepting of financial assistance, New York City Bar 
Opinions98 and later an ABA ethics opinion99 were not, especially when financial 
assistance raised implications of client-getting. In Opinion 20, for example, the 
inquiring lawyer asks regarding his client, an injured, out-of-work seaman with a 
meritorious claim, 
Would it be improper for me as his attorney to advance him a little money to 
keep him from actual physical suffering pending his trial. .. (i]f he is permitted 
to starve, his physical suffering will be such that he will be compelled to accept 
a very small and inadequate [settlement] offer that [the defendant] has made. I 
consider that the amount they have offered him is about one-twentieth of what a 
jury would award my client. 
The New York Bar Committee responded in the negative, objecting that the 
assistance would give the lawyer an "undue personal interest" in the claim. 100 
In Opinion 391, the Committee takes a client-getting focus rather than a 
conflict of interest one, suggesting that an occasional loan may be permissible, as 
long as the practice does not become known, inducing clients to seek the lawyer's 
services based on his willingness to provide financial assistance. 101 
Eventually, the ABA entered its bar opinion into the mix. In ABA Opinion 288, 
the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances asserted a broader 
prohibition: "Payments, pending trial in personal injury cases, by an attorney to 
or for the benefit of his injured client, for any purpose other than to cover 
expenses of litigation, subject to reimbursement, are improper." 102 And regarding 
financial assistance: "if publicized, constitutes a holding out by the lawyer of an 
improper inducement to clients to employ him .... " 103 The ABA thus relied on 
not only the client-getting rationale but also the conflict rationale in prohibiting 
financial assistance whether the practice produced client-getting or not. 
97. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof' I Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521,522-23 
(Iowa 1979); Fla. Bar v. Hastings, 523 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1988); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. 
Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 387-88, 390 (Md. 1989); Office of Disc. Counsel v. Williams, 553 N.E. 2d 1082, 1082-83 
(Ohio 1990) (buying claims case); People v. Hellewell, 811 P.2d 386, 387 (Colo. 1991); In re Arensberg, 159 
A.D.2d 797, 797 (N.Y. 1990); In re Skevin, 517 A.2d 852, 854-55 (N.J. 1986); In re Berlant, 328 A.2d 471, 476 
(Pa. 1974); In re Pusser, 254 S.E.2d 926,926 (S.C. 1979) (loan for food and Christmas); In re Mountain, 721 
P.2d 264, 268 (prenatal expenses); Shea, 374 S.E.2d at 64-65; Miss. Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d 1293, 
1295-98 (Miss. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 1190, 1191-92 (Fla. 1990) (used clothes case). 
98. See New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'! & Judicial Ethics, Op. 781 (1953), 779 (1953), 391 
(1936), 319 ( 1934), 20 (1925). 
99. ABA Comm. on Prof' I Ethics, Formal Op. 288 (1954) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 288]. 
100. New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof' I & Judicial Ethics, Op. 20 (1925). 
101. New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'! & Judicial Ethics, Op. 391 (1936), 319 (1_?34). 
102. ABA Formal Op. 288. 
103. /d. 
236 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 16:223 
Thus, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, in its 1954 
Opinion 288, rejected a "settled course" 104 of court decisions to the contrary in 
opining that loans that were not client-getting related were unethical. 105 Caselaw 
prior to Opinion 288 held financial assistance improper only if it was offered as 
inducement or retention of a client (client-getting) or if assistance repayment was 
contingent on recovery. 106 
In the years following Opinion 288, some courts rejected or narrowly 
interpreted it, 107 some followed it, 108 and some ignored it. 109 Illustrative of the 
courts rejecting Opinion 288 is In re Ratner. 110 The Ratner fact pattern in many 
ways follows that of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia. 111 In Ratner, 
respondents were regional counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. 
The Wichita Bar Association levied several charges against respondents, grouped 
into four categories: (1) solicitation of employment; (2) stirring up and breeding 
litigation; (3) division of fees with a lay agency, namely the Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen; and (4) advancement of living expenses to clients. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas eventually found against the bar and for the accused 
lawyers and imposed no discipline. 112 The first three categories of charges were 
largely obviated by the Supreme Court's contemporaneous holding in Brother-
hood ofTrainmen. 113 As to the financial assistance, even the accusing bar did not 
object to the financial assistance except to the extent that it produced client-
getting (and the corresponding new claims against the railroad). 114 The evidence 
showed that respondents arranged for the Wichita State Bank to make loans to 
certain clients. The court held that such loans did not violate Canon 42 because 
all clients were personally responsible to the bank for the loans, because the law 
does not condemn friendly aid made to a "poor suitor who is prosecuting a 
meritorious cause of action," 115 because respondents never advertised that such 
loans were made, and because repayment of the loans was not premised on the 
I 04. Payne H. Ratner, Advancing Money to Clients-Whether Unethical, 15 NACCA L. J. 410, 413 ( 1955); In 
re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447, 461 (6th Cir. 1966) (Edwards dissenting) (Opinion 288 is "against the great weight of 
opinion in the courts in this country.") 
105. Ratner, supra note 104, at 413 discussing ABA Formal Op. 288. 
106. William Roger Strelow, Loans to Clients for Living Expenses, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1419, 1421 ( 1967), citing 
McCallum, 173 N.E.2d at 831; Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Mytton v. Mo. Pa. R.R., 211 S.W. Ill (Mo. App. 1919); 
State ex rei. Neb. Bar Ass'n v. Rein, 4 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 1942). 
107. In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432,440-45 (N.D. Ohio 1965); In re Ratner, 399 P.2d 865,875 (Kan. 1965). 
108. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n. v. Ruffalo, 199 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1964); El Janny v. Cleveland Tankers 
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 91,94 (N.D. Ind. 1962). 
109. In re Moore, 134 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1956); State ex. rei Beck v. Lush, 103 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1960). 
II 0. 399 P.2d 865 (Kan. 1965). 
Ill. 377 U.S. I (1964) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the 
Brotherhood to advise workers who are injured and recommend specific lawyers). 
112. Ratner, 399 P.2d at 876. 
113. !d. at 869 discussing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. I ( 1964). 
~ 
114. Ratner, 399 P.2d at 874. 
115. !d., quoting Jahn v. Champagne Lumber Co., 157 F. 407,418 (7th Cir. 1908). 
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outcome of litigation. 116 Because there was not a "regular practice" of making 
these loans, there was no violation. The court quotes the most prominent legal 
ethics commentator of the time, Henry Drinker: "[A lawyer] may loan money to a 
client, but not as a regular practice," sounding again the client-getting rationale 
for the prohibition. 117 
With the adoption of the Model Code in 1969, 118 and the states' rapid adoption 
of it, 119 the legal profession's policy on acquisition of interest and financial 
assistance became law. Until then, organized bar agitation in the form of 
prosecution of plaintiff's lawyers, 120 the tentative acquisition prohibition, 121 and 
Opinion 288, 122 had had mixed success at best when faced with courts willing to 
engage in sustained policy analysis of the prohibitions' value. 123 After the 
adoption of the Model Code provisions, 124 however, most courts reverted to a 
role of near-mindless application of the rules's language, eschewing any policy 
analysis. 125 One court that did delve deeply into the policies underlying the rules 
could not rationalize them with the rule, leading to a strained, twisted reading of 
the rules to reach the result dictated by the policies. 126 
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins, the Louisiana Bar Association 
brought charges of ethical violations against Edwins. Edwins had advanced 
living expenses to his clients. Edwins was disciplined for various other 
violations. 127 Concerning the financial assistance, the facts showed that Edwins 
advanced to one of his clients several different amounts of money on several 
different occasions. 128 However, under the circumstances here, the court was 
unwilling to apply a per se rule that DR 5-103(B) 129 was violated. The court held 
that the advancement of minimal living expenses, of minor sums necessary to 
prevent foreclosures, or of necessary medical treatment do not violate the "spirit 
116. Ratner, 399 P.2d 865. 
117. /d. at 875, quoting HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 95 ( 1953). 
118. MODEL CODE (1969). 
119. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.6.3, at 56. 
120. Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Sizer, 267 S.W. 922. 
121. 1908 CANONS Canon I 0. 
122. MODEL CODE DR 5-103 (1969). 
123. Reece, 31 N.E. at 749; McCallum, 173 N.E.2d at 831; Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Sizer, 267 S.W. 922; 
Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. at 440-445; Ratner, 399 P.2d at 875. 
124. MODEL CODE DR 5-103(A), (B) (1969). 
125. See infra section II. 
126. La. State Bar Ass'n v. Ed wins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976). 
127. /d. at 444,448. 
128. /d. at 444-45. 
129. MODEL CODE DR 5-103(B) reads as follows: 
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not 
advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee 
the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical 
examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately 
liable for such expenses. 
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of the intent" 130 of the disciplinary rule. The court was troubled that an ethics 
rule's prohibitions would cause an impoverished person to be unable to proceed 
with his claim or to be forced to settle for an inequitably small amount because of 
his financial problems. The Edwins court could not abide the result that a lawyer 
ethics rule should deprive poor people from access to the courts. Therefore, the 
court here classifies living expenses such as Edwins had advanced under DR 
5-103(B)'s permissible "expenses of litigation" umbrella. The court set out four 
requirements for this favorable treatment of the financial assistance: the 
advancements were not promised as inducement to obtain employment, they 
were reasonably necessary under the facts, the client retained liability for 
repayment of the funds, and the attorney did not encourage public knowledge of 
the practice. 131 In its result, the Edwins decision is thoroughly consistent with In 
re Ratner, 132 In re Sizer 133 and other prevailing pre-Code caselaw, permitting 
financial assistance in the absence of client-getting motives and contingent 
repayment. 134 But the adopted language of 5-103(B) made this result seem a 
strained, disingenuous interpretation of clear language to the contrary. While the 
court acknowledged the difficulty of making this reading of the Code, the court 
justified its strained reading based on the policies furthered by it. 135 No 
subsequent court has reached the Edwins result in the face of the language of DR 
5-103(B) or Model Rule 1.8(e). 
Subsequently, the ABA set the Kutak Commission to work to reform the ethics 
code, eventually adopting the Model Rules in 1983. An early proposed draft of 
the Kutak Commission included a financial assistance prohibition but lacked an 
acquisition of interest prohibition entirely. 136 Once adopted though, the Model 
Rules retained both prohibitions from the Model Code. 137 Nonetheless, the ABA 
relaxed one aspect of the Code's financial assistance rule, allowing for contingent 
repayment of litigation expenses and for outright payment of litigation expenses 
on behalf of indigent clients. 138 The definition of living expenses was no broader 
than the Code's, certainly not the strained reading of the term given by the Edwins 
court. But the allowance of contingent repayment indicated a diminished reliance 
on the acquisition of interest rationale, or at least an acknowledgment that its 
dangers are no greater than those already found in the contingent fee arrangement 
130. Edwins, 329 So. 2d at 445-47. 
131. /d. at 446. Advances made by Edwins to a second client did not satisfy these requirements and the court 
disciplined him. /d. at 447-48. 
132. Ratner, 399 P.2d at 875. 
133. Sizer, 267 S.W. 922. 
134. Reece, 31 N.E. at 749; McCallum, 173 N.E. at 831; Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Sizer, 267 S.W. 922; 
Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. at 440-45; Ratner, 399 P.2d at 875. 
135. Edwins, 329 So. 2d at 446. 
136. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf 
69-73 (Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof' I Responsibility 1999). 
137. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e), (i). 
138. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e). 
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itself. Courts applying the Model Rule have been as formalistic in their 
application as were most of those following the Model Code provisions.I 39 
In recent years, a few states have created an exception to their financial 
assistance rules to allow loans for living expenses to indigents when "reasonably 
needed to enable a client to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put 
substantial pressure on the client to settle a case because of financial hardship 
rather than on the merits ... "I 40 provided the client remains ultimately 
responsible for repayment and that no promise of such financial assistance was 
used in attracting the client.I 4 I Others have simply amended their financial 
assistance rules to permit loans for "reasonably necessary medical and living 
expenses."I 42 These exceptions are meant to answer the Edwins court's argument 
that the strict enforcement of acquisition of interest rules inhibit access to courts 
for indigents. In effect, these states have done by rule most of what the Edwins 
court strained to do with statutory interpretation. While leaning in the right 
direction, these exceptions leave the rules intact without considering the inherent 
value in the rule itself. In effect, these amendments ameliorate the effects of rules 
that should not exist in the first instance. 
The ALI undertook to create the Restatement in the 1990's, publishing the final 
material in 1998.I43 The Reporters for the project had misgivings about the 
wisdom of the current law on financial assistance and acquisition of interest, but 
the adopted Restatement sections propose no substantive changes and Model 
Rule 1.8(e) or (i).I 44 
Most recently, the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, charged with reform of the 
Model Rules, proposed no substantive change in the financial assistance or 
acquisition of interest rules, and the ABA adopted its final report largely intact. I45 
II. FORMALIST TREATMENT OF THE RULES 
These rules are ripe for formalist treatment, which surprisingly has hit its peak 
139. See, e.g., Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 1191 (Lawyer gave used clothes and $200 for basic necessities to client. 
Court held there was no violation of 1.8(e) because the assistance was not "in connection with" litigation. Court 
stated, quoting the referee: "Absent some kind of condition for repayment from suit proceeds or establishment/ 
maintenance of the attorney/client relationship as a result of the assistance, I simply do not believe it is 
appropriate to sanction lawyers who provide used clothing for a client's child or [give] $200.00 for an indigent 
client's necessities."); Kandel, 563 A.2d 387 (holding appropriate a public reprimand for lawyer payments to 
client for car repairs to get to medical appointments despite finding that lawyer was not motivated by 
self-interest or personal gain); Hastings, 523 So.2d 571. 
140. MINN. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(3); TEX. DISC. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.08(d). 
141. MINN. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(3). 
142. TEx. DISC. R. OF PRoF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.08(d). 
143. REsTATEMENT (2000). 
144. REsTATEMENT § 36 (1), (2). "The Reporters support the minority position, but that position was not 
accepted by the Institute." /d. at§ 36 Reporter's Note. 
145. The text of the adopted Ethics 2000 report may be found at www.abanet.org/cpr/ e2k-report_home.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002). 
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in the analysis of these rules in the second half of the 20th century, 146 long after 
formalism had given way in most legal analysis to legal realism and its 
descendants. Bar discipline and court review of it lean toward formalism 
generally. 147 Among the likely reasons for this lean toward formalism is the 
awkwardness of expressing and relying on rationales for rules that are bar 
self-interested. 148 As such, the lean is often at its strongest when the rationales for 
the bar ethics rules in question are most entwined in bar custom and self-interest. 
The rules apply only in the context of litigation, a difference in treatment between 
litigation and planning/business matters that the Restatement drafters delicately 
describe the rationale for as "largely historical." 149 When the rationales are 
enmeshed with bar self-interest, the temptation is powerful for courts to short-cut 
any analysis of policy or of the rules' rationales by uncritically applying the 
language of the rules, thus obviating the need to discuss the policies underlying 
the rule or their particular advancement by the rules' application to the lawyer's 
conduct in the particular case. 150 How awkward to recite the unflattering 
rationales advanced by the drafters, protecting their corporate clients from claims 
brought by injured workers or consumers. 151 
Since the adoption of the Model Code, courts reviewing disciplinary charges of 
lawyers accused of acquisition or financial assistance have almost entirely 
declined to consider arguments about the rules' effectiveness, fairness, absence of 
harm to clients, just results, or lawyer good intentions: 52 In 1934, Max Radin 
146. See, e.g., Arensberg, 553 N.Y.S.2d 859 (lawyer disciplined under DR 5-103 for gift payments made to 
current client for personal financial needs, no solicitation, no acquisition of interest); Pusser, 254 S.E.2d 926 
(lawyer disciplined under DR 5-103 for loaning client's family $1,000 for "food and Christmas"); Berlant, 328 
A.2d 471 (Lawyer disciplined for making advances to indigent clients for food, rent, and other necessities. 
Court held that the purposes of the advances is irrelevant to the finding of a violation but may be used as 
mitigation of punishment); Hel/ewe/1, 811 P.2d 386 (lawyer disciplined under DR 5-103 for loaning medical 
malpractice client $1 ,555); Kandel, 563 A.2d 387 (public reprimand for lawyer payments to client for car 
repairs to get to medical appointments despite finding that lawyer was not motivated by self-interest or personal 
gain); Hastings, 523 So. 2d 571 (Lawyer was disciplined for making arrangements for third party to make loans 
to clients with clients remaining responsible for repayment. He pled guilty, but argued that FELA permits such 
loans in FELA matters. Court "offers no opinion on the merit of [lawyer's] argument, but accepts his plea of 
guilty."); Shea, 374 S.E.2d at 64 (Court responded to lawyer's argument that no harm is produced by violations 
of 5-103 as follows: "The short answer to that question is that the disciplinary rule says that such conduct is 
improper."). But see Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 1191 (Lawyer gave used clothes and $200 for basic necessities to 
client. Court says no violation of 1.8(e) because the assistance was not "in connection with" litigation. Court 
quoting the referee: "Absent some kind of condition for repayment from suit proceeds or establishment/ 
maintenance of the attorney-client relationship as a result of the assistance, I simply do not believe it is 
appropriate to sanction lawyers who provide used clothing for a client's child or [give] $200 for an indigent 
client's necessities."). 
147. SIMON, supra note 14, at 9; William Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
217, 220 ( 1996) (relating the relationship between Positivism and categorical judgment). 
148. James E. Moliterno, Why Formalism, 49 KAN. L. REV. 135 (2000). 
149. RESTATEMENT§ 36, cmt. b. 
ISO. See, e.g., Shea, 374 S.E.2d at 64. 
151. AUERBACH, supra note 56, at 41-50. 
152. See supra cases cited in note 146. 
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encouraged courts to use legal realist analysis rather than formalism in financial 
assistance cases. 
Courts should evaluate financial assistance and acquisition matters case by case, 
which would "substitute judgment by reality for judgment by category" .... 
There is no reason why judges should be relieved from the most important part 
of their task which is to take account of the actual conditions within which the 
parties before [the judge] live. 153 
At Radin's time, it seems, courts took such an approach, but abandoned it 
following the adoption of the Model Code. Take the financial assistance rule as 
applied in Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar 
Association v. Bitter. 1s4 In Bitter, the lawyer was disciplined in part for loaning 
his impecunious clients $986.70 interest free for humanitarian reasons. Iss This 
conduct violated DR 5-103(A). 156 To be sure, the violated rule is based in part on 
conflicts of interest grounds and in part on the common law of champerty, 
barratry, and maintenance (in this instance, especially maintenance). 1s7 Bitter's 
conduct violated the plain meaning of the rule's language. Iss The language of the 
rule does not require that Bitter have taken unfair advantage of his clients; thus, 
his motives and the good that his actions may have actually produced for his 
clients and for the justice system 1s9 are irrelevant. 160 Even if Bitter's actions 
produced justice by, for example, allowing his clients to withstand delaying 
tactics or a low-ball settlement offer of the defendant and stay in the litigation to a 
judgment based on the merits of their claim, Bitter's conduct would have violated 
the legal ethics rule and subjected him to discipline. Never mind that other 
conflicts of similar danger and magnitude allow for client waiver; 161 this rule's 
language does not permit waiver, so Bitter's clients' probable waiver or consent is 
irrelevant. Never mind that similar conduct in the absence of litigation, say 
during a client's patent application process, but not during a patent infringement 
suit, would be permitted. The Restatement, in an admirable show of candor, 
acknowledges that this rule distinguishes between litigation and non-litigation 
153. Radin, supra note 11, at 72-73, 78. 
154. 279 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1979). See MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e); MODEL CODE DR 5-103(A). 
155. Bitter, 279 N .W.2d at 523. 
156. /d. 
157. See RESTATEMENT § 36 cmt. c; ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule 1.8(e) cmt 10 
(2002). 
158. Cf MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e). 
159. Allowing, for example, a meritorious claim to be settled for an amount that more accurately reflects the 
plaintiff's damages. 
160. See Radin, supra note II, at 72 (referring to the good that sometimes results from lawyer acts of 
champerty and maintenance). 
161. See MoDEL RULES Rule 1.7; Lavaja v. Carter, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699-700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing 
representation of multiple parties who were informed and consented). 
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settings for "largely historical" reasons. 162 Never mind that there was no 
suggestion that Bitter's clients' claims were anything other than meritorious. 
Never mind that the actions and crimes for champerty, barratry, and maintenance 
(the historical antecedents to the ethics rule) all required a malice element; 163 the 
language of this rule does not, and so Bitter's good motivation and the absence of 
any showing of malice toward his clients' litigation opponents are irrelevant. 
How far would a court get if it had to make policy-based arguments in applying 
Model Rule 1.8(e) to Bitter's conduct? In part, at least, the court would find itself 
analyzing what result would best serve the original drafters' (the drafters of the 
1908 Canons and ABA Opinion 288's expansion of the prohibition) intent to 
restrain the bringing of personal injury claims by those unable to withstand the 
delay of litigation against the drafters' corporate clients. 164 What better reason to 
use a formalist approach than to avoid dealing with awkward and embarrassing 
policy discussions? 
Imagine the discussion of "legislative history" or historical context in a legal 
realist style opinion applying some of the bar ethics rules when the drafters' intent 
was to exclude outsiders from the profession or diminish their ability to attract 
and serve clients. For example, setting higher educational standards for 
admission to the bar was one means chosen to keep the unwanted out of the 
profession, to "purify the stream at its source," as one ABA source put it. 165 
Somewhat ironically, a 1924 court treated these issues in a much more realist 
manner, using a candid, policy-based analysis. 166 In Sizer, the Missouri Supreme 
Court reviewed a petition to disbar two personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers for 
soliciting clients and in particular for offering and in some cases providing 
financial assistance to their clients during litigation. Although the disciplinary 
matter was brought (as procedure required it to be) in the name of the bar 
association, the facts were investigated, the charges encouraged, and the 
litigation was financed by a consortium of corporate interests and their 
lawyers. 167 In language rare in court opinions reviewing bar discipline, the court 
considered the context of the matter before it, even as it insisted that the context 
should not alter its judgment: 
Let us speak plainly, as courts should speak, and say that every earmark of the 
evidence in this case shows that it is an effort by corporation lawyers as against 
what they call damage-suit lawyers. All this (true, as it may be, and we think it 
162. RESTATEMENT§ 36 cmt. b. 
163. See Radin, supra note II, at 67. 
164. Some states have amended their versions of Model Rule 1.8(e) to ameliorate this impact of the rule. See, 
e.g., MINN. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (2002); TEX. DISC. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.08(d) (2002). 
165. Am. Bar Ass'n Reports 656-88 (1921); for more on the bar's interest in raising educational standards to 
exclude unwanted ethnic and racial groups from bar membership, see AUERBACH, supra note 56, at 113. 
166. Sizer, 267 S.W. 922. 
167. !d. at 923. 
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is) does not change this case. The motive for preferring the charges is of small 
consequence, if, in fact, the charges are sufficient in law, and the respondents 
are guilty .... [Nonetheless) [i)f the bar associations, sua sponte, had preferred 
the charges, we would have one background, but where the corporation lawyers 
of the [bar] associations have induced the associations to act upon evidence 
procured by [their investigator], the background is different. 168 
243 
The Sizer court considered the nature of the "damage-lawyers" clients' 
injuries, the economic hardships being suffered by their families, and the 
settlement tactics undertaken by defendants in determining to dismiss the 
disciplinary charges against Sizer and Gardner. 169 The almost jarring nature of 
the court's candor evidences its inconsistency with the modern norm in bar 
discipline cases and the usual absence of discussion of context. 
Doing legal realist analysis of the application of a legal rule requires 
examination of the policies that drive the rule, in part by examination of the 
rationales that animated the rule's makers. When those policies are embarrassing, 
or worse, the temptation is strong to confine the analysis to a more formalist 
approach. Particularly where the drafters are the legal profession, and the rule's 
adopter and interpreter, a bar association or court, are also part of the legal 
profession, the push will be overwhelmingly toward formalism and away from 
any analysis that requires examination of the embarrassing policies for the rules. 
III. THE PROFFERED RATIONALES 
When courts do not apply the rules in a wooden, formalist manner, three 
rationales are prominently relied upon. First, they are conflicts rules, meant to 
prevent lawyer imposition on client interests. Second, they are champerty rules, 
meant to prevent the stirring of needless litigation. And third, closely related to 
the champerty rationale, they are client-getting, anticompetitive restrictions, 
meant to prevent lawyers from luring clients with promises of cash paid for good 
claims. 170 
A. THE CONFLICTS RATIONALE 
When a lawyer takes a stake in a client's litigation, whether through 
acquisition of interest in violation of Model Rule 1.8(j), or through financial 
assistance in violation of Model Rule 1.8(e), some potential for conflict of 
interest is present. In the main, the lawyer's interests have been aligned in a 
more-than-usual way with those of the client: the lawyer's share in the claim or 
the lawyer's interest in repayment of loans made to the client is more valuable in 
168. /d. at 924-25. 
169. /d. at 925-34. 
170. See infra section III.C. 
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direct proportion to the client's success. 171 In this respect, the lawyer may be 
more-than-usually interested in doing well by the client's interests. 
Some danger does exist, however, that the lawyer may favor the lawyer's own 
interests over those of the client. Imagine, for example, a lawyer who regularly 
purchases a two-thirds interest in client's cases, investing both her time and 
money. Imagine that lawyer has ten client matters pending on day one. Over time, 
four of those matters settle and the lawyer reaps her two-thirds share of the 
claims. Imagine that five more of the ten matters have gone to trial, at 
considerable expense to the lawyer, and all produced defendant verdicts, 
resulting in a loss to the lawyer of the amount paid for the two-thirds shares of 
those client's claims. A settlement offer is made in the tenth case that would be 
acceptable to the client. The lawyer may prefer to gamble on a successful 
outcome at trial in order to recoup some of her losses on the five unsuccessful 
claims. The lawyer may press the client, shading the lawyer's advice toward 
continuing to trial, favoring the lawyer's interests over the client's. There lies the 
conflict. A similar example in which the lawyer regularly advances money to 
clients works less well at producing a conflict. In such an example, the lawyer's 
interest in the matter is not precisely proportional to the recovery on the claim, 
but rather is fixed at the amount of financial assistance and the agreed to terms for 
its repayment, modified by the likelihood of recovery from the client. 172 As a 
result, the lawyer's interest will not be altered in the same way by the amount of a 
client's recovery. Rather, the conflict created in the loaning money context may 
cut the other way, causing a lawyer to be more risk-averse. When the client owes 
a lawyer a fixed amount, the lawyer may prefer that a client accept a settlement 
offer rather than gamble on a greater (or a zero) recovery at trial, again shading 
advice toward the lawyer's interests. 
In general, conflicts rules focus on effects that are adverse to the client. 173 And 
because of the costs associated with eliminating a client's counsel of choice, 
conflicts-induced disqualifications "should ... be no broader than necessary." 174 
Not every adverse effect on representation produces a disqualifying conflict. 175 
Only those that present a "substantial risk" of being "material" ought to be 
171. RESTATEMENT§ 125 cmt. c ("[The acquisition of interest prohibition], which applies to an interest 
arguably consistent with the client's, is derived more from the common-law rules against maintenance and 
champerty than from a concern about a conflict of interests, although it can also involve the latter.") 
172. As a business transaction between lawyer and client, these terms would have to comply with Model 
Rule 1.8(a). 
173. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7; RESTATEMENT§ 121. 
174. RESTATEMENT§ 121 cmtb. 
175. Unlike many other conflicts situations, disqualification of a client's lawyer is an inappropriate remedy 
for a violation of the financial assistance rule. Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 518 
(E.D. Pa. 1999). Contra Waldman v. Waldman, 499 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (App. Div. 1986) (Wife's lawyer was 
disqualified for loaning her money to pay car insurance and mortgage payments. "There is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the advances of money by [the lawyer to the client] were motivated by anything other than [the 
lawyer's] genuine concern for [the client's] financial plight.") 
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disqualifying. 176 "The standard requires more than a mere possibility of adverse 
effect." 177 Even then, only conflicts that are not amenable to client waiver 
produce disqualification. 178 
The effects on clients of acquisition of interest and financial assistance 
transactions may not be conflicts at all, or at least not the sort of conflicts that 
otherwise trigger the application of the general conflict rules. 179 What passes as a 
conflict in this context may be no different from the ordinary economic conflict of 
interest that lawyers and clients have as a matter of routine and that does not 
trigger the application of the conflicts rules. Any time a lawyer bills for time 
spent, the lawyer has an interest in continuing to work on a client's matter for a 
longer rather than shorter time. A client, by contrast, paying for the lawyer's 
services by the hour, would prefer a like resolution or recovery on a claim in a 
shorter rather than longer time. A lawyer in such circumstances has an interest in 
continuing a matter beyond a settlement offer that might be acceptable to a client, 
conceivably shading advice toward the lawyer's and away from the client's 
interest. This circumstance does not give rise to a conflicts analysis under the 
ethics rules. Elliott Cheatham, in his early casebook on legal ethics asserts that 
"[t]here is an inescapable conflict of interest between a lawyer and client in the 
matter of fees." 180 And in the common sense of the word "conflict," he is quite 
correct. Lawyers and clients have adverse interests in the fee contract, with 
lawyers often in a position to take advantage of a disparity in knowledge and 
bargaining power. But no one regards the hourly fee contract and the potential 
issues of lawyer advantage taking in it as an event that requires the application of 
the conflict of interest rules. Though it presents a conflict of similar magnitude, 
the financial assistance rule does not bar a lawyer who owns stock or other 
ownership interest in an enterprise from being retained by enterprise to conduct 
litigation. 181 The difference between this and other examples of lawyer-client 
economic conflict and that of maintenance or champerty is imperceptible. 182 
Further, the genuine conflicts of interest harm that comes from violations of 
Model Rule 1.8(e) or (i) are not different in kind from those that inhere in 
176. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7; RESTATEMENT§ 121 cmt c. 
177. RESTATEMENT§ 121 cmt c(iii); see Board of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246-47 (2nd Cir. 
1979) (refusing to use "appearance of impropriety" standard for conflicts); Sherrod v. Berry, 589 F. Supp. 422 
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (same). 
178. RESTATEMENT§ 122. 
179. MODEL RULES Rules 1.7, 1.9. 
180. ELLIOTT CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 170 ( 1938). 
181. RESTATEMENT § 36 cmt c. 
182. See also Comm. of Prof' I Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. McCullough, 468 N.W.2d 
458 (Iowa 1991) (no violation of DR 5-l 04(A), 5-l 0 I (A), and 5-l 03(A) because the court had previously held 
that taking a contractual security interest to secure payment of attorney's fees does not constitute entering into a 
business transaction with a client). 
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acceptable contingent fee arrangements. 183 The acquisition rule has in its text an 
exception for reasonable contingent fees. In a contingent fee matter, the lawyer 
buys a stake in the client's claim with the lawyer's otherwise uncompensated 
time and effort. Substituting into this transaction the lawyer's money or other 
assets for the lawyer's time and effort changes the acceptable contingent fee into 
a violation of Model Rule 1.8 (j). Similarly, in a conflicts sense the concern with 
financial assistance to a client relates to the lawyer's personal interests in the 
outcome of the matter. Again, the difference between such a stake and the 
contingent fee stake are negligible. In most financial assistance matters, the 
magnitude of the lawyer's interest attributable to the financial assistance will be 
far less than that attributable to the contingent fee contract. 
Contingent fees do not require client consent in the conflicts sense. Rather they 
require a substitute for client consent: a written fee agreement must be signed by 
the client; that agreement must clearly inform the client regarding client liability 
and accounting terms for litigation expenses. 184 Further, the mere fact that the fee 
agreement is a voluntarily entered contract dictates that every fee arrangement 
carries implicit client consent. Similar substitute-for-consent provisions could 
accompany rules regulating rather than prohibiting acquisition and financial 
assistance. 
The positive effects of contingent fees also apply to financial assistance and 
acquisition of interest, but these rationales are seldom given as support for 
allowing financial assistance or acquisition of interest. The Restatement praises 
the positive effects of contingent fees: 
[Contingent fees] give lawyers an additional incentive to seek their clients' 
success and to encourage only those clients with claims having a substantial 
likelihood of succeeding .... [They] enable the client to share the risk of losing 
with the lawyer, who is usually better able to assess the risk and bear it by 
undertaking similar arrangements in other cases. 185 
These features no less apply to acquisition of interest and financial assistance, 
and help explain why rational clients would desire to undertake such transactions 
with their lawyers, belying the paternalistic client-protection conflicts rationale 
proffered by the organized bar. 186 The conflicts argument given for the financial 
assistance and acquisition of interest rules is largely the same paternalistic, 
disingenuous argument made by the turn of the 20th Century bar leaders: clients 
183. RESTATEMENT § 36 cmt. a (The Restatement recognizes the connection between the acquisition of 
interest, financial assistance and contingent fee rules. "[This section is] ancillary to sections 34 and 35 which 
regulate lawyers in fee contracts and restrain certain conflicts of interest that tend to distract lawyers from their 
clients' interests."). 
184. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(c). 
185. RESTATEMENT§ 35 cmt. b. 
186. AUERBACH, supra note 56, at 42-48; Topps v. Pratt & Callis, P.C., 564 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill. 1990) (the 
purpose behind DR 5-103 is to maintain an attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of a client). 
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need to be protected from over reaching by unscrupulous personal injury 
plaintiff's lawyers. 187 
Contingent fees themselves have withstood recent attacks, attacks that are not 
unlike those of the historical period that gave rise to the rigid restrictions on 
acquisition of interest and financial assistance. 188 
The English prohibitions on champerty and maintenance were based on the 
same rationales as were their prohibition of contingent fees. 189 When those 
rationales failed to support a prohibition of contingent fees in the United States' 
different circumstances, so should they have failed to support restrictions on 
champerty and maintenance. 
Prior to the adoption of the Model Code, courts as well recognized that loaning 
money raises a possible conflict, but only when the lawyer subverts the client's 
interests. 190 "By loaning money to his client, the [lawyer] put[s] himself in a 
position where his personal interests might well become adverse to [the client's]. 
The making of such a loan by the lawyer is not, however, necessarily unethical 
conduct. It is unethical only if the loan is made to accomplish some purpose 
contrary to the client's welfare or if, in seeking repayment, the lawyer pursues 
practices which are unfair or unduly oppressive." 191 When the financial 
assistance is an outright gift, as in Arensberg 192 and Taylor, 193 there is no 
buying-interest-type conflict. The remaining conflict is the fear of client 
unwillingness to overrule the lawyer's judgment at various litigation stages 
because of a sense of obligation to the client's benefactor. But this sort of conflict 
exists when a lawyer does pro bono work or when a lawyer gives a client 
exceptionally dedicated service, neither of which would ever be regarded as a 
conflict, let alone an unwaivable one. Far from suggesting impropriety, these are 
both examples of admirable lawyer professionalism. 
If financial assistance and acquisition of interest present conflicts, however, 
187. AUERBACH, supra note 56, at 42-50. 
188. Compare SHARSWOOD, supra note 60, at 153-64, AUERBACH supra note 56, at 43-50, and Am. Bar Ass'n 
Reports 33, 61, 63-74 (1908), with Richard M. Bimho1z, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 
37 UCLA L. Rev. 949 ( 1989); Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics 
Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev., 247 (1996); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet 
Without the Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 ( 1989); Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making 
Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173 (1995); Thomas J. Micelli & 
Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees and Lawyers: Their Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 382 (1991) (arguing that contingent fee arrangements do not provide incentives to take due care); 
Terry Thompson, Are Attorneys Paid What They're Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 187 ( 1991) (arguing that in certain types of cases clients are better off without representation than 
with contingent fee attorney representation). 
189. BODKIN, supra note 8, at 75-76. 
190. Grievance Comm. of the Fairfield County Bar v. Nevas, 96 A.2d 802 (Conn. 1953). In many respects, 
ABA Formal Op. 288 first added an explicit conflict rationale to financial assistance restrictions. 
191. Nevus, 96A.2d at 805. 
192. Arensberg, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 859. 
193. Taylor, 648 So.2d 1190. 
248 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 16:223 
they are no more grave than conflicts that are routinely waivable by clients in 
other circumstances. Interests of client autonomy dictate that clients make 
trade-offs in conflict situations all the time. 194 The client's power to consent is 
generally limited by three factors: client incapacity or inadequate information 
regarding the conflict; the representation violates law; or the conflict is so grave 
that "it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate 
representation .... " 195 If the client is sufficiently informed by the lawyer 
regarding the conflict, any conflict, then the "inadequate information" rationale 
for denying the client's power to waive fails. 196 Unlawful representations that 
cannot be waived include multiple defendant representations in capital cases, for 
example. 197 To be sure, where substantive law separate from the ethics rules 
continue to prohibit maintenance or champerty in a broad way (not to include the 
traditional narrowing element of malice, for example), the representation would 
be precluded. But few such jurisdictions remain. 198 As such, only if acquisition of 
interest or financial assistance conflicts are so grave that the lawyer cannot 
provide adequate representation to the client should clients be denied the power 
to waive any conflict that may be present. 
Under this rationale, the rules fence out only the gravest conflicts as those for 
which waiver is not permitted. 199 For example, clients may not waive the conflict 
that arises when their lawyer also represents their direct adversary in litigation,200 
although even such conflicted representation may be waivable in certain types of 
multiparty litigation where the conflict is somewhat less direct and less certain to 
place the lawyer in the position of harming one client's interests to advance 
another's?01 Clients may not waive a conflict when their lawyer may effectively 
be an opposing party.202 And clients may not waive the conflict present when 
their lawyer owns a substantial interest in the opposing party.203 In all of these 
examples, the conflict is far graver than that presented by either an acquisition of 
interest or a financial assistance transaction, and there are no obvious trade-off 
positive effects as exist for the client in the financial assistance or acquisition of 
194. RESTATEMENT§ 122 cmt. g(iv) ("[C]oncern for client autonomy generally warrants respecting a client's 
informed consent."); Unified Sewage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1350 (9th Cir. 1981) ("We do not find 
it necessary to create a paternalistic rule that would prevent the client in every circumstance from hiring a 
particular attorney if the client knows [the likely ramifications of the conflict]. Clients who are fully advised 
should be able to make choices of this kind if they wish to do so."). 
195. RESTATEMENT§ 122cmt.b. 
196. /d. at§ 122 cmt. c(i). 
197. /d. at§ 122 cmt. g(i); Fleming v. Georgia, 270 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1980). 
198. See infra section Ill. C. 
199. RESTATEMENT§ 122 cmt. g. 
200. ld. at§ 128 cmt. c(i), § 129. 
201. /d. at§ 128 cmt. c(ii). 
202. See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 391 N.E.2d 1355 (N.Y. 1979) (client's lawyers were former members of 
defendant law firm making client's lawyers potential judgment payers). 
203. RESTATEMENT§ 125 cmt. c, illus I; Kapelus v. State Bar, 745 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1987); In re Holmes, 619 
P.2d 1284 (Or. 1980); Attorney Grievance Comm' n v. Collins, 457 A.2d 1134 (Md. 1983). 
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interest situations. 204 
In all other conflicts situations, clients are empowered to waive the conflict and 
go forward with their lawyer of choice, understanding and accepting the 
conflict's risks in exchange for benefits they perceive from the engagement of the 
lawyer. The client in a maintenance or champerty situation may well prefer to 
undertake the risks of the lawyer conflict in exchange for a benefit. The benefits 
come in several forms: the client may wish to share the risk of recovery with a 
knowledgeable person (his lawyer);205 the client may be able to pursue the 
litigation beyond early settlement offers with the investment or financial support 
of the lawyer;206 the client may well regard as valuable the "investment" of the 
lawyer in the matter in that the lawyer's own interests are at stake making the 
lawyer far less likely to lack diligence.207 To the extent that these are conflicts 
rules, invoking client interests at stake, clients ought to be permitted to weigh the 
advantages and risks and choose if they wish to waive the conflicts involved in 
maintenance and champerty situations.208 
Some early cases treated the purchase of a share of the subject matter of 
litigation as a business transaction between lawyer and client, voidable unless the 
lawyer can show the transaction's objective faimess?09 These requirements 
approximate modem waiver of conflicts, and parallel the requirements for 
business transactions between lawyers and clients found in Model Rule 1.8(a). 
Requiring such safeguards ameliorates the likelihood of harm from any conflict 
that might be present in the transaction. For an acquisition of interest or financial 
assistance transaction, these safeguards are present in Model Rule 1.8(a). Under 
Model Rule 1.8(a), heightened conflict waiver requirements must be met. A 
lawyer entering into a business transaction with a client must ensure that the 
transaction is "fair and reasonable," that its terms are submitted to the client in 
writing and in terms understandable by the client, that the client has an 
opportunity to obtain independent advice and counsel concerning the transaction, 
and that the client consents to the transaction in writing.210 In the absence of 
prohibitions on acquisition of interest or financial assistance, lawyers entering 
such transactions with clients would be obligated to comply with Model Rule 
1.8(a)'s stringent requirements. 
204. For positive effects, see infra notes 206-08. 
205. RESTATEMENT§ 35 cmt. b (Contingent fees "enable the client to share the risk of losing with the lawyer, 
who is usually better able to assess the risk and bear it by undertaking similar arrangements in other cases."). 
206. See MINN. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCf Rule 1.8(e) (2002). 
207. RESTATEMENT§ 35 cmt. b (Contingent fees "give lawyers an additional incentive to seek their clients' 
success and to encourage only those clients with claims having a substantial likelihood of succeeding."). 
208. For two cases that treat acquisition of interest as a waivable conflict, see In re Ainsworth, 614 P.2d 1127 
(Or. 1980) and State ex rei Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Hollstein, 274 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1979). 
209. Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387, 40 I (1860), reh 'g denied 15 Cal. 405 (1860); SHARSWOOD, supra note 
60, at 155 n.l. 
210. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(a); RESTATEMENT§ 126. 
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Neither the acqms1t10n of interest nor the financial assistance transaction 
presents a conflict of consequence. To the extent that they do so present in 
particular cases, the conflicts are insufficiently grave to warrant denying clients 
the power to consider their circumstances and waive the conflict. 
B. THE STIR LITIGATION, ABUSE SYSTEM RATIONALE 
Although litigation, and especially excessive or unnecessary litigation, is often 
criticized in the United States, the intensity and breadth of disdain for litigation 
present in England never made the trip across the Atlantic. Worries about stirring 
litigation are far less weighty in the United States than in England. Litigation in 
the American culture is not viewed as universally evil such as it was in Christian 
Medieval Europe. Indeed, litigation has served to shape policy and social good in 
ways unknown in England. Frivolous litigation, to be sure, is to be discouraged 
and sanctioned, but there is no religious or universal societal evil that attaches to 
enforcing rights and imposing justified liabilities through court action. As such, 
devices that allow individuals to bring justified litigation are not against public 
policy. That difference allowed the growth and acceptance of contingent fees, 
dictated the American rule regarding fee shifting, and generally drove policies 
that allowed American courts to be more open than their English counterparts. 
Nonetheless, some courts continue to state a stirring litigation rationale for the 
acquisition of interest and financial assistance rules.211 
Historically, champerty and maintenance stirred litigation by the powerful 
against the weak? 12 Additionally, the malice element meant that litigation 
advanced by means of champerty or maintenance was by definition brought with 
ill intentions and was unlikely to be meritorious. United States courts early on 
recognized the parallel between maintenance and acceptable contingent fees: 
each made meritorious litigation possible by the weak against the powerful, a 
virtually opposite result from the imported doctrines' effect in England? 13 
Outside of the lawyer ethics rules, the law of champerty has diminished in 
importance, scope and effect.214 The notion that meritorious claims ought to be 
suppressed was never embraced by American courts; rather it was advanced by 
the organized bar as a means of serving the interests of the bar's leaders' 
211. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387; In re Brown, 692 P.2d 107 (Or. 1984) (Lawyer was disciplined for providing 
financial assistance to personal injury client without mention of claims' merits. "Payments or advances of this 
type for living expenses encourage either the commencement or continuance of legal proceedings."); Topps, 564 
N.E.2d at 198 (The Court voided loan agreements between lawyer and client because they violated the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. The Court maintained the harm is not to client but to justice system.). 
212. Radin, supra note II, at 64; RESTATEMENT § 36 cmt. b ("Maintenance and champerty ... Thought to 
breed needless litigation and to foster the prosecution of claims by powerful and unscrupulous persons."). 
213. McCallum, 173 N.E. at 831; Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Sizer, 267 S.W. 922. 
214. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) 
Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57 (2000); see infra section Ill. C. 
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corporate clients.215 
· With sophisticated controls on frivolous litigation already in place, current 
acquisition of interest and financial assistance rules disproportionately prevent 
the bringing of meritorious claims, not frivolous ones. For the same reasons that 
lawyers are less likely to bring frivolous claims on contingent fee bases, lawyers 
are less likely to buy frivolous claims or support clients during litigation of 
frivolous claims.216 Giving lawyers a greater interest in claims is likely to reduce 
rather than increase the incidence of frivolous claim bringing. Lawyers, 
particularly those knowledgeable regarding the value of claims, will be unlikely 
to invest in weak, let alone frivolous claims. A lawyer investing in a frivolous 
claim would face a double disincentive: not only is she likely to lose her 
investment in the claim, but she risks litigation sanctions as wel1? 17 
C. THE CLIENT-GETTING RATIONALE 
The current restrictions on acquisition of interest and financial assistance are 
not sufficiently supported by a conflicts of interest rationale. To the extent that 
conflicts exist, they should be waivable ones? 18 Neither are they sufficiently 
supported by a stirring litigation rationale? 19 If these rules are to be sustained, 
they rest on a client-getting restriction rationale. 
From the time of its importation into the United States until ABA Opinion 288 
and the adoption of the expanded Model Code prohibitions in the 1960's, the 
primary rationale for maintenance and champerty law was the restriction of 
client-getting, with litigation stirring in the background.220 The client-getting 
rationale remains prominent. 221 
Client-getting restrictions have always been "grade B" ethics, more etiquette 
215. AUERBACH, supra note 56 at 42-50. 
216. Van Gieson v. Magoon, 20 Haw. 146, 149 (1910) ("If an attorney undertakes to pay (litigation 
expenses], he is more likely to do so in a meritorious claim than in one devoid of merit."). RESTATEMENT§ 35 
cmt.b. 
217. FED. R. Clv. P. II. 
218. See infra section III. A. 
219. See infra section 111.8. 
220. Sizer, 267 S.W. 922; McCallum, 173 N.E. 827; Johnson, 151 N.W. 125; Mytton, 211 S.W. Ill; Rein, 4 
N.W.2d 829; Ratner, 399 P.2d at 874 (Accusers conceded propriety of financial assistance as long as practice is 
not a regular one that would amount to client-getting activity.); Moore, 134 N.E.2d 324 (Court declined to 
discipline lawyer for financial assistance to client when payments were unrelated to attracting client.); New 
York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof' I & Judicial Ethics, Op. 391 (1936) (permissible to make a loan as long as 
the practice does not produce client-getting); DRINKER, supra note 117, at 95 ("[A lawyer] may loan money to a 
client but not as a regular practice."). 
221. "(The financial assistance] rule precludes solicitation of clients with promise of living expense loans." 
RESTATEMENT§ 36 cmt c; Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 1991 (A lawyer gave used clothes and $200 for basic necessities 
to a client. The Court found no violation of 1.8(e) because the assistance was not "in connection with" 
litigation.); Arensberg , 553 N.Y.S.2d 859 (lawyer charged under both 5-103 and state judiciary law, sec 
488(2)-488 (2) which prohibits soliciting with promises of payment); Kandel, 563 A.2d 387 (Public reprimand 
for lawyer payments to client for car repairs to get to medical appointments. Court found that lawyer was not 
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than ethics?22 Much of the early restriction on client-getting was based on what 
were perceived to be unfair competitive devices among lawyers.223 A lawyer 
willing to advance funds to a client was at a competitive advantage. Arguably that 
advantage was unrelated to quality of service (although clients may feel that 
quality includes a willingness to serve the client's needs, including financial 
needs, every bit as much as it includes prompt returning of telephone calls and 
other service-related activities). Advantages unrelated to quality were once 
deemed inappropriately anti-competitive, and were suppressed in various ways 
by the bar?24 As recently as 1995, courts continued to occasionally suggest that 
an anti-competitive rationale for the financial assistance rule was appropriate?25 
In Carroll, the court disciplined a lawyer for providing financial assistance and 
suggested that advances are an "improper inducement" for retention, and that 
naturally a client will retain the lawyer who makes advances without regard to 
quality?26 But that suggestion is not fundamentally different from the assertion 
that a client will always choose the lawyer who charges the lowest fee, or who 
provides some other benefit that may be unrelated to quality. Appropriateness of 
fee competition is well established?27 These sorts of restrictions on practice have 
faded, with lawyers permitted to compete with one another on many levels. Most 
notable among such now unlawful restrictions are minimum fee schedules?28 
Bar-imposed minimum fee schedules were considered to be simply price-
supporting, anticompetitive devices, meant to restrain a lawyer from taking a 
competitive advantage (a lower fee) that was unrelated to the quality of service 
provided. Since Goldfarb, such a rationale for the acquisition of interest and 
financial assistance rules, though once the prominent client-getting rationale, 
must fail. 
motivated by self-interest or personal gain. Court says there is a public policy to avoid unfair lawyer 
competition for clients and avoid acquisition of interest in litigation). 
222. DRINKER, supra note 117, at 211 ("Since there is no inherent malum in se in a lawyer's advertising ... or 
directly soliciting employment, [advertising and solicitation rules] are really rules of professional etiquette 
rather than of 'ethics.' "). 
223. /d. at 190-91, 211 n.6 (coupling advertising and solicitation with encroachment upon other lawyers's 
clients). 
224. E.g., bar-set minimum fee schedules, unlawful since Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 
( 1975); early anti-contact rule rationale included the unseemliness of attracting away other lawyers's clients, see 
DRINKER, supra note 117, at 190 (including discussion of anti-contact rule in chapter on lawyer duties to fellow 
lawyers); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 17 and 124, applying Canon 9 
("Compensation for his services is an attorney's professional right and, [fellow lawyers are required to avoid 
interfering with that right.]"); restrictions on encroachment of other lawyers' clients, see DRINKER, supra note 
117, at 190-91. 
225. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d 1293) (applying Model Rule 1.8(e), court expresses concern that permitting 
financial assistance would cause "bidding wars" for cases and lead to the further denigration of the legal justice 
system); In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461 (Ariz. 1979). 
226. Carroll, 602 P.2d at 467. 
227. Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 ( 1977); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773. 
228. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773. 
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Since Bates v. Arizona State Bar/29 states have lacked power to discipline 
lawyers for truthful, non-misleading advertising of lawful services. Although 
discipline for misleading statements about services230 and many forms of 
in-person solicitation remain within the states' power to prohibit,231 poor taste 
and lack of professional dignity are not sanctionable.Z32 Arguably, the Supreme 
Court has reopened the prospect of discipline for lack of dignity by considering 
evidence of diminished respect for the legal profession in Florida Bar v. Went For 
lt.233 The restrictions upheld in Went For It were time, place, and manner 
restrictions, rather than blanket prohibitions of particular practices. While data 
could undoubtedly be generated regarding public disdain of lawyers who would 
buy claims or advertise support of personal injury clients through litigation, a 
substantial expansion of Went For It would have to occur to warrant using the 
dignity rationale to prohibit rather than regulate acquisition of interest or 
financial assistance. 234 
Advertisement of unlawful acts or practices is also appropriately disciplin-
able.Z35 For example, a lawyer's truthful promise in an advertisement to engage 
in bribery or assaultive tactics on clients' behalf or that offers a prohibited 
contingent fee in a criminal matter236 would subject the lawyer to discipline237 
and in certain instances criminal liability as well.238 
But here the client-getting rationale for the acquisition of interest and financial 
assistance rules becomes circular. How would lawyer advertisements change if 
the ethics rules on acquisition of interest and financial assistance rules were 
abolished? They might sound something like: "We pay top dollar for good 
229. Bates, 433 U.S. 350. 
230. See, e.g., In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
231. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
232. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding unconstitutional provisions 
such as DR 2-IOI(B), requiring advertisements be done "in a dignified manner."). 
233. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 ( 1995) (using data regarding client-getting practice's tendency to 
diminish public regard for the legal system in evaluating restrictions on the practice). 
234. For lower courts' application of the Went For It invitation to consider the reputation-damaging effects of 
advertising on the profession as a legitimate state interest, see Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F. 3d 397 (6th Cir. 200 I) 
(upholding Kentucky criminal statute imposing 30 day solicitation ban and recognized reputation of lawyers as 
a substantial state interest); Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir. 1997) (state of Maryland asserting 
protection of "reputation and dignity of the legal profession"); Moore v. Morales, 63 F. 3d 358 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding Texas 30 day mail solicitation waiting period rule because Texas submitted public complaints 
regarding such solicitation); Revo v. Disc. Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of N .M., I 06 F. 3d 929 (I Oth Cir. 1997) (holding 
blanket ban on mail solicitation unconstitutional, indicated that 30 day ban would be permissible and agreed 
with New Mexico that protecting the perception of the legal system is a substantial state interest); John Phillips, 
Six Years After Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The Continual Erosion of First Amendment Rights, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000). 
235. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Bates, 433 U.S. 
at 384. 
236. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(d)(2). 
237. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. 
238. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4 (3d ed. 2000); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5.03(1). 
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claims"; "We'll afford you a generous living allowance during litigation"; "Why 
wait years for your ship to come in? We pay up front for good claims."239 These 
sorts of ads, if truthful, may not be restricted unless the acts offered are unlawful. 
And today, the acts are made unlawful almost exclusively by the ethics rules 
themselves rather than by some extemallegal rule. 
Outside of the lawyer ethics rules, the law of champerty has diminished in 
importance, scope and effect. 240 In Massachusetts, "the common law doctrines of 
champerty, barratry, and maintenance [are] no longer ... recognized."241 In New 
York, courts have narrowed the doctrine, ruling that it only exists when some 
particular mischief or strife has resulted from the champertous conduct.242 
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has redefined champerty according to a 
"modem view."243 The Florida court suggested that "officious intermeddling is a 
necessary element" of champerty and that the law of champerty and maintenance 
is no longer defined in strict, formalist terms.Z44 In reality, this "modem view" 
may be closer to the original elements, which included malice. 245 Only the 
lawyer restrictions, and primarily the lawyer restrictions beginning with the 
Model Code in the late 1960's, sent courts into a strict formalist mode of 
application of the law of champerty and maintenance.246 In some states, 
remaining restrictions are tied to the notion that gambling, in this context 
speculation in claims, is against public policy,247 a notion that fades further into 
the 19th Century ethos with each passing year and each state that legalizes 
gambling or authorizes a lottery. A number of states, while appearing to have 
champerty restrictions that remain in force, have not enforced the restrictions for 
many years.Z48 
None of the currently legitimate rationales for restrictions on client-getting 
practices justifies a blanket ban on financial assistance or acquisition of interest as 
a client-getting device.249 Even where they do, provisions regulating rather than 
239. I am no ad man. Well polished, creative versions of these themes would no doubt appear in the 
marketplace. 
240. See generally Martin, supra note 214. 
241. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997). 
242. See, e.g., Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E. 2d 691 (N.Y. 1971); Limpar 
Realty Corp. v. Uswiss Realty Holding Inc. 492 N.Y.S. 2d 754 (App. Div. 1985); Wainco Funding v. Logiudice, 
606 N.Y.S. 2d 86 (App. Div. 1993). 
243. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996). 
244. !d. at 682. 
245. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 490, n.46; BODKIN, supra note 8, at 5, 50. 
246. See infra section II. 
247. See, e.g., Wilson, 688 So. 2d 265; Tosi, 685 N.E.2d at 583; Reece, 31 N.E. at 751 (referring to courts past 
discouragement of the gambling spirit). 
248. Martin, supra note 214, at 67. 
249. An additional practical problem with prohibiting financial assistance as an inappropriate client-getting 
device exists. A client may discharge a lawyer at any time for any reason. The current rule precludes a lawyer 
from offering a loan prior to the establishment of the lawyer client relationship, but nothing precludes a client 
from asking for a loan after the relationship begins and discharging a lawyer who declines to make the loan. 
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prohibiting acquisition of interest and financial assistance could be crafted to 
eliminate their use as client-getting devices. In this way, the conflicts and harm to 
third parties and the system could be isolated and regulated or permitted while 
prohibiting the use of acquisition of interest or financial assistance to attract 
clients. This is in essence of the distinction drawn by the Sizer court in the 1920's 
and the position taken by the Minnesota amendments liberalizing the practice of 
providing financial assistance?50 The exclusively client-getting restriction ratio-
nale is a purely anti-competitve one: lawyers willing to advance financial 
assistance or buy claim shares would have an advantage over lawyers unwilling 
to make such arrangements. 
IV. A BRIEF NOTE ABOUT ECONOMICS 
A complete economic analysis of a market for claims251 is beyond both the 
scope of this article and my expertise. Nonetheless, a few things economic may 
be said here. 
There are currently very active markets for judgments and markets for 
unmatured contract claims. Those markets are the business of collection agencies 
and support the active trading of mortgage, credit card, business, and other debt. 
The market for tort judgments has grown more active in recent years, resulting in 
several successful investment corporations that purchase portions of judgments at 
a discounted rate, allowing a successful plaintiff to have funds in hand in 
exchange for the value of the judgment during appeal and enforcement.252 An 
expanded market for tort claims, particularly one that included lawyers as 
permissible players, would benefit tort victims, investors, and the tort system 
itself?53 The effects might be most positive on class action litigation.254 
Most fundamentally, restraints on voluntary transactions make markets less 
efficient. Lawyers and clients are currently constrained by the acquisition of 
interest rules from engaging in risk sharing transactions, despite a desire on the 
part of some lawyers and clients to enter such transactions. Restraints have a 
tolerated-but-negative economic effect when some external policy reason exists, 
the power of which exceeds the negative economic impact. The policy 
250. Sizer, 267 S.W. 922; MINN. R. OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.8(e). 
251. See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383 (1989); Ari 
Dohner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1529 (1996); Martin, supra note 214; Donald L. Abraham, 
Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation 
Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1297 (1992); Daniel C. Cox, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity 
in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 153 (1990); Pamela Blatt Wilson, Attorney lnvestmellt in Class Action 
Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291 (1994). 
252. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts For Sale, NAT'L L.J. Jan. II, 1999, at A I. 
253. See generally Dohner, supra note 251; Martin, supra note 214; Abraham, supra note 251; Cox, supra 
note 251; Peter Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435 (1995); 
Mark Shukaitis, A Market in Persona/Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 ( 1987). 
254. See generally Wilson, supra note 251. 
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underpinnings for the acqUisitiOn rules are weak and limited/55 leaving an 
unjustified negative economic impact to result from the enforcement of the 
acquisition rules. 
Markets are more efficient when the players in the market have knowledge. 
The market in unmatured claims, including tort claims, such as would be created 
by the abolition of the acquisition of interest rules, would add players with 
knowledge that are currently shut out of such markets. Lawyers to whom clients 
come for services, particularly personal injury services, have expertise in 
evaluating claims. The Restatement drafters recognized that among the advan-
tages to allowing the analogous contingent fee are that lawyers would "encourage 
only those clients with claims having a substantial likelihood of succeeding" and 
that lawyers are "usually better able to assess the risk [of recovery] and bear it by 
undertaking similar arrangements in other cases."256 
Markets are more efficient when the players are more directly affected by the 
outcomes of market activity. Here again, a market for claims that involve lawyers 
more directly ought to produce a more efficient market. Lawyers are always 
interested in the outcome of their clients' matters. Abolition of the acquisition of 
interest rules would enhance that interest in an economically efficient manner. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The financial assistance and acquisition of interests rules ought to be abolished 
or substantially amended. Their history is shallow and weak rather than deep and 
strong as has been mythologized by the 201h Century organized bar. None of the 
three usual rationales support the rules in their current form. The rules present no 
genuine conflict of interest that is not otherwise present in ordinary, everyday 
lawyer-client relationships. To the extent that any true conflict exists, it is not the 
sort of grave conflict for which no informed waiver should be allowed. Rather, 
there are clear benefits to a client in the relationship that in many cases will 
outweigh the conflict risks. In such circumstances, waiver is permitted elsewhere 
in the conflicts rules and ought to be allowed here. To the extent that these rules 
continue with a conflicts rationale, the Texas and Minnesota modifications should 
prevail as they at least ameliorate the effects of ill-founded rules. 
The risks of system abuse through frivolous claims of aggressive lawyering are 
adequately guarded against by control systems not present in the heyday of 
maintenance and champerty law. Among other controls, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 and other litigation abuse sanctions as well as malicious prosecu-
tion actions obviate the need for the rules on the abuse-of-system rationale. If 
anything, furthering the interests of lawyers in the claims of their clients is likely 
to decrease rather than increase the incidence of frivolous claim bringing. 
255. See infra section Ill. 
256. RESTATEMENT§ 35 cmt. b. 
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The client-getting suppression of competition rationale is circular. Client-
getting tactics that are distasteful are not sanctionable. If advertisements 
regarding financial assistance or acquisition offers are truthful, there remains 
only the "unlawful offer" objection to such client-getting tactics. The demolition 
of the criminal and tort champerty and maintenance law in most jurisdictions 
means that the only unlawfulness of these offers is created by the ethics rules 
themselves. If the ethics rules are not supported by either of the first two 
rationales, they fail to be supported by the third, since the third, in the absence of 
the others, represents a sort of bootstrapping problem: in client-getting rationale 
terms, the rules make their own unlawfulness rationale, which would otherwise 
not be the case. 
Abolition of these rules would allow lawyers to support clients and acquire 
claims, creating an efficient market for unmatured claims, including tort claims. 
It would eliminate the awkwardness of courts punishing innocent lawyer 
financial assistance to clients based on vacuous reasoning. It would close happily 
one more chapter on the self-interestedness of bar ethics rules. 
